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Abstract
We propose a bootstrap-based test of the null hypothesis of equality of two firms’
conditional Risk Measures (RMs) at a single point in time. The test can be applied to
a wide class of conditional risk measures issued from parametric or semi-parametric
models. Our iterative testing procedure produces a grouped ranking of the RMs
which has direct application for systemic risk analysis. A Monte Carlo simulation
demonstrates that our test has good size and power properties. We propose an ap-
plication to a sample of U.S. financial institutions using ∆CoVaR, MES, and SRISK,
and conclude that only SRISK can be estimated with enough precision to allow for
meaningful ranking.
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1 Introduction
Financial risk management is fundamentally based on the comparison of risk measures
across different assets, portfolios, or financial institutions. Examples include the compar-
ison of total risk of two portfolios measured by their volatility, of tail risk measured by
the Value-at-Risk (VaR) or the Expected Shortfall (ES), of systematic risk measured by
the beta, or the comparison of systemic risk scores of two financial institutions and many
others. Comparing unconditional risk measures can be done using a variety of paramet-
ric or non-parametric tests. However, most risk measures are expressed conditionally on
an information set and the corresponding forecasts are generally issued from a dynamic
parametric or semi-parametric model. For instance, a (M-)GARCH model can be used to
produce conditional VaR or ES forecasts, or a DCC can be used to estimate a dynamic
conditional beta (Engle, 2012). As a consequence, the conditional distribution of the es-
timated risk measure is generally unknown and depends on which estimation procedure is
used.
In this paper, we propose a general testing methodology that takes into account estima-
tion uncertainty to statistically test for equality of conditional risk measures for different
assets, portfolios or firms at a single point in time. We propose two types of tests. The first
one is a bootstrap-based comparison test of two risk measures. This test can be applied
to a wide class of conditional risk measures and (semi-)parametric models. For example, it
can be used to compare conditional measures of volatility, VaR, or ES for two assets or two
portfolios at a particular time. It can also be used to test the relative level of systemic risk
for two banks for a given day. Additionally, it can be applied in order to test the equality
of two conditional risk measures (for instance two VaRs) issued from two different models
(say, GARCH and RiskMetrics) for the same asset or the same portfolio.
The second test is a procedure that allows one to allocate a large set of assets, portfolios
or firms into groups of elements that are statistically indistinguishable from each other in
terms of riskiness, given a conditional risk measure. This method, inspired by the Model
Confidence Set (MCS) of Hansen et al. (2011) can be applied to any type of risk measure.
However, it is particularly well suited to identify clusters of Global Systemically Important
Banks (G-SIBs) that have similar contribution to systemic risk. This is exactly what the
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Financial Stability Board (FSB) does each year when it publishes its five-bucket list of G-
SIBs in order to set extra capital requirement (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2013). Doing so, the FSB recognizes the inevitable estimation uncertainty in their estimated
riskiness and do not fully rely on point estimates.
Many measures of systemic risk have been proposed in the academic literature over
the past years, the most well-known being the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and the
Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES) of Acharya et al. (2010), the Systemic Risk Measure
(SRISK) of Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2015), and the Delta Condi-
tional Value-at-Risk (∆CoVaR) of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014). These measures are
designed to summarize the systemic risk contribution of each financial institution into a
single figure. The appeal is that there exists a ranking of financial institutions according
to their systemic risk measures, that can be displayed on real time with a daily or weekly
frequency (see for instance the V-Lab website of the Volatility Institute, NYU Stern). How-
ever, claiming that firm A is more risky than firm B because its systemic risk measure is
higher, implies that risk is estimated without error. This is certainly not the case, since
these measures typically rely on dynamic parametric models that require sophisticated es-
timation techniques. Even if the model is correctly specified, replacing the true parameters
of the dynamic model by their estimates has an impact on the estimation accuracy of the
risk measure itself. Indeed, there is convincing evidence that the signal produced by the
systemic risk measures are not reliable and are affected by estimation risk (e.g. Danielsson
et al., 2011). If this is taken into account it is unlikely that one can discern such an absolute
ranking.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one alternative test for equality of systemic
risk measures. Castro and Ferrari (2014) propose a method for testing whether two firms
differ in terms of their ∆CoVaR. However, their approach is specific to ∆CoVaR and to
the linear quantile regression. In contrast, our method is more general as it works with any
conditional risk measure (SRISK, SES, VaR, ES, etc.) and is not specific to any particular
estimation method.
Our study is related to the literature on estimation risk in dynamic risk models. The
estimation risk is generally assessed through asymptotic confidence intervals. For instance,
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Chan et al. (2007) and Francq and Zako¨ıan (2015) derive the asymptotic confidence in-
tervals for the conditional VaR estimator in the specific context of heavy-tailed GARCH
models. Gourie´roux and Zako¨ıan (2013) consider a different approach based on an Estima-
tion adjusted VaR (EVaR). Alternatively, several papers propose resampling methods to
carry out inference on risk measures. Hartz et al. (2006) introduce a bootstrap approach
to correct the estimation bias and to improve the VaR forecasting ability of the normal-
GARCH model. Christoffersen and Gonc¸alves (2005) and Pascual et al. (2006) propose a
more general approach to assess the estimation error of VaR and ES forecasts. Their re-
sampling techniques allow the computation of bootstrap-based confidence intervals around
the risk forecasts issued from historical simulation methods or GARCH-type models. Fi-
nally, Escanciano and Olmo (2010, 2011) implement robust backtests for the VaR, using
resampling methods.
Unlike previous studies, we do not focus on the inference for a single financial asset. Our
testing strategy is designed to compare the riskiness of two or more assets, given the esti-
mation risk of the corresponding risk measures. In that sense, our study can also be related
to the literature on forecast comparison tests (Diebold and Mariano, 1995; Hansen, 2005).
However, our null hypothesis and therefore our test differ in some important ways. First,
in most cases, we do not compare two models, but the riskiness of two assets, portfolios,
or financial institutions, measured with the same measure and the same model. Second,
we do not compare a forecast to an ex-post observation. Finally, and most importantly,
we test for equality of two or more conditional risk measures at time t, for which we have
only one estimate. We do not test the equality of these measures over the full sample. In
the case where our test is used to compare the forecasts of the same risk measure issued
from two alternative models, there are also some similarities with the literature devoted
to the volatility forecast comparison (Hansen and Lunde, 2006; Patton, 2011). However,
our comparison test does not require the use of a proxy variable since it is not designed to
determine the ‘best’ model.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a general definition for the
conditional risk measures and propose some examples. Section 3 presents two types of
tests: a comparison test of two risk measures and a bucketing procedure. The bucketing
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procedure is clearly a multiple testing problem, and as such it is important to control the
number of false rejections. For that, we consider two alternative methods based on the
False Discovery Rate (FDR) and the Family Wise Error Rate (FWE). Section 4 discusses
the bootstrap implementation. Section 5 presents some Monte Carlo simulation results
for both tests. Results suggest that the bucketing procedure has desirable properties, i.e.
appropriate size and high power. In Section 6, we propose an empirical application for
three systemic risk measures, namely the MES, the SRISK and the ∆CoVaR, based on a
panel of 94 US financial institutions. Section 7 concludes and suggests extensions.
2 Framework and Risk Measure Definitions
Consider an asset, a portfolio, or a firm indexed by i and a Fi,t−1-conditional risk measure
(denoted RM) issued from a dynamic parametric or semi-parametric model, where Fi,t−1
denotes the information set available at time t − 1. Formally, we define RM at time t as
follows:
RMi,t = fi (θi, ω;Xi,t−1) , (1)
where fi (.) denotes a functional form that depends on (i) the risk measure itself (for
instance, the VaR) and (ii) the parametric or semi-parametric model used to produce
the corresponding forecast (for instance, a GARCH model). Xi,t−1 is a set of variables
belonging to Fi,t−1, θi is the vector of model’s parameters and ω is a vector of parameters
specific to the risk measure itself. The latter parameters are determined by the user. For
instance, in the case of the VaR, it corresponds to the risk level, generally fixed to 1% or
5% by convention.
The notation for RMi,t encompasses a wide class of (semi-)parametric models and con-
ditional risk measures. For instance, RMi,t can be a measure of price variation (conditional
volatility), a systematic risk measure (conditional beta), a tail risk measure (VaR, ES),
or a systemic risk measure (MES, SRISK, ∆CoVaR). The model could be a univariate
or a multivariate GARCH model, a quantile or a linear regression model, etc. Thus, this
notation can be viewed as a generalization of that used by Gourie´roux and Zako¨ıan (2013)
for parametric VaR models.
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As examples of the notation we consider (i) a conditional VaR based on a Student-
GARCH model, (ii) the conditional MES of Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and
Engle (2015), (iii) the SRISK of Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2015)
and (iv) the ∆CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014). These are also the risk measures
used throughout the paper.
Example 1 (VaR-GARCH) Consider a demeaned return process ri,t associated to an
asset indexed by i. Assuming a t-GARCH(1,1) model for ri,t, the corresponding conditional
VaR for a coverage rate τ ∈ [0, 1] can be expressed as a linear function of the conditional
volatility σi,t of the returns as follows:
fV aRi (θi, ω;Xi,t−1) = −t−1ν (τ)
√
v − 2
v
σi,t,
with σ2i,t = γi +αir
2
i,t−1 +βiσ
2
i,t−1. t
−1
ν (α) denotes the µ-quantile of the standardized Student
cdf with ν degrees of freedom. As such θi = (γi, αi, βi, ν)
′, ω = τ and Xi,t−1 =
{
ri,t−1
}
,
where ri,t−1 is the set of return observations for firm i up to time t− 1.
Example 2 (MES) The MES measures how firm i’s risk taking adds to the financial
system risk (measured by the ES). Let us denote the market return as rm,t =
∑n
i=1wi,tri,t,
with wi,t the value-weight of firm i = 1, ..., n at time t, and ri,t the demeaned firm returns.
The conditional MES is defined by the first derivative −∂Et−1(rm,t | rm,t < C)/∂wi,t, where
C is a threshold. If the vectorial process (ri,t rm,t)
′ follows a GARCH-DCC, Brownlees and
Engle (2015) show that:
fMESi (θi, ω;Xi,t−1) = −σi,tρim,tEt−1(m,t|m,t < C/σm,t)
− σi,t
√
1− ρ2im,tEt−1(i,t|m,t < C/σm,t),
where σ2i,t = γi+αir
2
i,t−1 +βiσ
2
i,t−1, ρim,t = Qim,t/
√
Qii,t|Qmm,t with Qij,t the (i, j)th element
of the so-called pseudo correlation matrix Qt, and Qt = (1 − αC − βC)Q¯ + αCt−1′t−1 +
βCQt−1, with i,t = ri,t/σi,t. Brownlees and Engle (2015) consider a non-parametric es-
timator (Scaillet, 2005) for the tail expectations of the standardized returns t. Then, we
have θi = (γi, γm, αi, αm, βi, βm, Q¯, αC , βC)
′, ω = (C) and Xi,t−1 =
{
ri,t−1, rm,t−1
}
.
Example 3 (SRISK) The SRISK is defined as the expected capital shortfall of a given
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financial institution i, conditional on a crisis affecting the whole financial system. Acharya,
Engle, and Richardson (2012) define the SRISK as follows:
fSRISKi (θi, ω;Xi,t−1) = max (0 ; k Di,t−1 − (1− k)Wi,t−1 (1− LRMESi,t)) ,
where Di,t and Wi,t denote the book value of total liabilities and the market value of the
financial institution,respectively, and k is a prudential capital ratio. LRMESi,t denotes the
long-run MES, i.e. the expectation of the firm equity multi-period return conditional on the
systemic event. The LRMES can be approximated as LRMESi,t = 1 − exp(−18MESi,t),
where MESi,t is the estimate of the MES for firm i at time t as defined in Example
2 (Acharya, Engle, and Richardson, 2012). Then, we have ω = (C, k)′ and Xi,t−1 ={
ri,t−1, rm,t−1, Di,t−1,Wi,t−1
}
. The vector θi is similar to that obtained in Example 2. The
individual SRISK is generally expressed as a percentage of the aggregate SRISK:
f%SRISKi = f
SRISK
i /
n∑
j=1
fSRISKj .
Example 4 (∆CoVaR) The ∆CoVaR is a systemic risk measure based on the CoVaR,
i.e. the conditional VaR of market returns given an event C(ri,t) observed for firm i:
Pr
(
rm,t ≤ CoV aRm|C(ri,t)i,t | C(ri,t)
)
= α. (2)
The ∆CoVaR is the difference between the VaR of the financial system conditional on the
distress firm i and the VaR of the system conditional on the median state of that same firm.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014) suggest using ri,t = V aRi,t(τ) as conditioning event and
estimating the CoVaR using a quantile regression model, rm,t = µτ + γτri,t. We then get:
f∆CoV aRi (θi, ω;Xi,t−1) = γτσi,t
(
F−1(τ)− F−1(0.5)) , (3)
where F−1(τ) is the τ -quantile of the standarized returns. Hence θi = {γi, αi, βi, γτ}, ω = τ
and Xi,t−1 =
{
ri,t−1, rm,t−1
}
.
Notice that the functional form fi (.) in Equation (1) is indexed by i. Indeed, even
if we consider the same risk measure for two assets i and j, one may use two different
parametric models to produce the corresponding forecasts. For instance, the notation allows
the comparison of the conditional VaR for Bank of America obtained from a GARCH model,
and the conditional VaR for Citigroup using an internal model based on RiskMetrics. On
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the contrary, if the functional form fi (.) is equivalent to that of fj (.) , it means that both
firms use the same type of parametric model to produce the risk forecasts. However, in all
cases, the vectors of parameters θi and θj are generally different for i 6= j.
3 Hypotheses of Interest and Test
We propose a general framework to statistically test for equality of conditional risk measures
obtained for, at least, two different assets, portfolios or financial institutions at a particular
time. In this section, we present two types of tests: (i) a comparison test of two risk
measures and (ii) a bucketing procedure. The latter is a form of sequential testing that
allows to allocate assets/firms to multiple buckets of equal risk.
3.1 Comparison Test of Risk Measures
We wish to test whether two assets or firms indexed by i and j respectively, present the
same level of risk at time t with respect to the conditional risk measure RMt. Such a risk
comparison test may be useful in many contexts. For instance, it allows a fund manager
to test the equality of two assets’ volatilities at a particular date, in order to implement
a risk parity investment strategy. It allows also a risk manager to test if the VaR of say
portfolio i is equal to the one of another portfolio j, for a given day. A third example is
when a regulator wishes to compare the SRISK for bank i, say Bank of America, and the
SRISK for bank j, say Citigroup, on a single day, e.g. on September 15th 2008, given the
information set prior to this date.
If there is no model uncertainty, i.e. if the functional forms fi (.) and fj (.) are known,
this test consists of comparing RMi,t = fi (θi, ω;Xi,t−1) to RMj,t = fj (θj, ω;Xj,t−1), where
θi and θj denote the true value of the parameters. Given the common information set
Ft−1 = Fi,t−1 ∪ Fj,t−1 for both assets, the two conditional risk measures are observed.
Then, the null hypothesis of equal risk at time t can be defined as:
H0,t : RMi,t = RMj,t. (4)
The null hypothesis is indexed by t, to stress the fact that we are testing the equality of
two conditional risk measures on a single date t given the information set Ft−1. Contrary
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to the forecast comparison tests (Diebold and Mariano, 1995) for instance, we do not test
for RMi,t = RMj,t over the full sample t = 1, ..., T , or over a sequence of out-of-sample
forecasts. Thus, the alternative hypothesis H1,t : RMi,t 6= RMj,t means that the risk of
asset i is different from the risk of asset j at time t given Ft−1, according to the risk measure
RMt.
The need for inference comes the fact that RMi,t and RMj,t are not observed, since
the parameters θi and θj are generally unknown and replaced by their estimators θ̂i and
θ̂j. So, the null hypothesis is based on the true risk measure implied by fi (.), RMi,t =
fi(θi, ω;Xi,t−1), while the estimated value R̂M i,t = fi(θˆi, ω,Xi,t−1) is affected by an estima-
tion risk. Our test boils down to the question of whether (fi(θˆi, ω;Xi,t−1)−fj(θˆj, ω;Xj,t−1))
is big enough relative to parameter estimation error coming from {θˆi, θˆj} to reject the null.
Testing the null hypothesis H0,t is challenging, as the conditional distribution of the
estimated risk measure R̂M i,t is generally unknown and may be difficult to obtain depending
on the model used to estimate the risk measure. Typically, the estimates are obtained
using (M-)GARCH models, whose estimates’ distribution is widely unknown. Furthermore,
even in the cases where the distribution is known (Chan et al., 2007; Gourie´roux and
Zako¨ıan, 2013), the joint distribution of R̂M i,t and R̂M j,t is almost surely not, except
for the trivial, but unlikely case of independence between the two risk measures. As a
consequence, traditional testing methods are not directly applicable and a new testing
procedure is needed. To achieve this goal, we use the assumed data generating process
(DGP) to bootstrap the conditional risk measures and obtain their distribution at time t.
We propose the following two-sided test statistic:
T (α) ≡ |xˆij,t|
c∗ij,t(α)
, (5)
where x̂ij,t = R̂M i,t − R̂M j,t and c∗ij,t(α) is the bootstrap critical value obtained from the
absolute null-value shifted bootstrap distribution of xˆij,t. The use of the critical value
means that the α% rejection point for all combinations (i, j) is scaled to 1. Rejection thus
occurs at the α% level if T (α) > 1. Ex-post, one may draw conclusions on which one is
the riskiest based on the sign of xij,t. The bootstrap is assumed to be asymptotically valid
for the risk measures considered, in the sense that it correctly reproduces the asymptotic
distribution of the risk measure estimator (see Section 4.2).
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Finally, our framework can be extended to test the equality of risk measure forecasts
for a horizon h > 1, by considering the information set Ft−h rather than Ft−1. Since
RMi,t = fi(θ
∗
i , ω;Xi,t−1) is stochastic given Ft−h, in that case the null hypothesis becomes
H0,t : E (xij,t|Ft−h) = 0.
3.2 Bucketing Procedure
When considering more than two assets, pairwise comparisons become problematic. One
could test for the significance of the difference between each pair, appropriately taking into
account the multiple testing problems that arise. However, without adding some additional
structure, the set of rejections is unlikely to lead to a cohesive ranking. Instead, we propose
an iterative bucketing procedure that can be used to obtain a grouped ranking of assets.
The objective is to get a complete ranking by means of a procedure inspired by the Model
Confidence Set of Hansen et al. (2011). Our procedure produces buckets of equally risky
assets, in the sense that we cannot statistically distinguish the assets within one bucket in
terms of their riskiness. This testing procedure can be applied to any type of conditional
risk measure, but it has particular application in the context of the systemic risk where the
goal is to rank the financial institutions according to their systemic risk contribution.
Consider the set of all financial institutions N 0. We start with the identification of the
set of most risky firms, defined at time t as:
N (1)t ≡ {i ∈ N 0 : xij,t ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N 0}. (6)
The goal is to find the set N (1)t . This is achieved through a sequence of comparison tests
where objects in N 0 are removed from the set under consideration if they are found to be
less risky. The null we are testing is therefore
H0,t,N : xij,t = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N , (7)
with N ⊆ N 0, the subset containing the not yet eliminated firms. The null hypothesis
states that all firms in the final set after the elimination procedure should be equally risky.
For any set N this can be tested using an equivalence test and an elimination rule (see
Section 3.4.1). If the equivalence test is rejected, we use the elimination rule to remove the
most significantly different firm, reducing the size of N , and re-apply the equivalence test.
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Our set of most risky firms is the subset of N 0 that contains N (1)t with a certain probability
which can be controlled. This procedure identifies the most risky set only. To obtain the
full ranking, we apply the procedure on the set N 0 \ Nˆ (1)t to obtain a second bucket, Nˆ (2)t .
This is repeated until all firms have been allocated to a bucket.
3.3 Procedure Implications
Of course, there are many different ways to obtain buckets of equally risky financial insti-
tutions, and even to rank them. However, the implications of our procedure are ideally
suited to ranking systemic firms.
First, the approach is one directional, which means we only control the Type I error
of the null of equal risk, in one direction as well. Since we consider a top-down approach
(from the bucket of the most risky firms to the less risky ones), a false rejection leads to a
firm being assigned to a less risky cluster in the next iteration. Under-estimating the risk
is in our opinion much more hazardous than the reverse, and this is controlled. Moreover,
if a false rejection occurs, the procedure has a self-correcting mechanism that minimizes
the effect on the relative ranking of the remaining firms. The firm that is falsely rejected,
is by definition the most risky firm in the set of firms not yet assigned to a bucket. As
such, if the power of our test is reasonable, it will be assigned to a bucket on its own. Even
though it is estimated as less risky than it ought to be, it is still deemed more risky than
all the remaining, less risky firms.
Second, the Type II error consists of failing to eliminate a firm, and assigning it to a too
risky bucket. In practice, what might happen is that a firm with a low point estimate but
a high standard error may be assigned to a riskier bucket than a firm with a higher point
estimate, but a low standard error. In some sense, these firms are loose cannons. Their
return series have characteristics that make it difficult to estimate their true risk with
accuracy. Again, due to the top-down approach, the resulting ranking will be prudent; in
case of large uncertainty, a firm is always put in the most risky bucket.
Finally, we want to emphasize that the number of buckets is not specified ex-ante. This
is the main difference with the approach proposed by the BCBS. Ex-post, the number of
buckets ranges between one and the total number of firms, depending on the precision of
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the estimates. Therefore, our testing procedure strikes a balance between compression and
accuracy of the ranking.
3.4 FWE and FDR
The bucketing procedure is clearly a multiple testing problem, and as such it is important
to control the number of false rejections. We consider two alternative controlling methods
that may result in different allocations (see Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 2012, for instance).
The Family Wise Error Rate (FWE) is defined as the probability of rejecting at least
one of the true null hypotheses. Controlling the FWE requires that the FWE be no bigger
than the significance level α, at least asymptotically. In many applications one might be
willing to tolerate a larger number of false rejections if there is a large number of total
rejections. Instead of allowing a fixed amount of false rejections, we tolerate a certain
proportion of false rejections out of total rejections. This is controlling the False Discovery
Proportion (FDP). Let F be the number of false rejections made by a multiple testing
method, and let R be the total number of rejections. The FDP is defined as FDP = F/R
if R > 0 and 0 otherwise. Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) suggest controlling the False
Discovery Rate (FDR), the expected value of the FDP. A testing method is said to control
the FDR at level α if FDR = E(FDP ) ≤ α, for any sample size T . A testing method is
said to control the FDR asymptotically at level α if limT→∞ supFDR ≤ α.
The next two sections will outline the methods to control either the FWE or the FDR.
Neither method is superior to the other. However, when the number of hypothesis to be
tested becomes very large, the FWE loses a lot of power, making it difficult to reject any
hypothesis at all. Romano et al. (2008b) argue that the number of false hypotheses rejected
may even tend to zero if the number of hypotheses tested increases. Common practice is
to control the FWE in ‘small’ problems, and control the FDR in ‘large’ settings. What is
small and what is large greatly varies by application. In the simulation exercise we will
shed some light on the performance of our newly proposed test.
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3.4.1 FWE controlling method
In order to carry out the bucketing procedure we need an equivalence test and an elimination
rule. In case of equivalence we have that xij,t = 0 for all i, j ∈ N . We propose the following
test statistic:
Tmax(α) ≡ max
i,j∈N
|xˆij,t|
c∗ij,t(α)
. (8)
Here, the need for standardization of the statistic becomes evident, as we want to identify
the firm which is most likely to be different from the rest. If there is a significant difference,
an elimination rule follows naturally. We eliminate the unit arg maxj∈N supi∈N xˆij,t/c
∗
ij,t(α),
or to put it simply, the most significantly rejected firm. Once we can no longer reject a
null hypothesis, all firms are equally risky and we identified a bucket.
The FWE can be controlled by obtaining an appropriate critical value for the Tmax (α)
statistic. Its critical value d∗t (α) is chosen such that
d∗t (α) = inf {x ∈ R : P (Tmax (α) ≥ x) ≤ α} . (9)
In practice, the probability distribution P is unknown, and we replace it with a suitable
bootstrap estimate P ∗, discussed in Section 4. The asymptotic results in White (2000) and
Romano and Wolf (2005) imply that our bootstrap method controls FWE asymptotically,
provided that the bootstrap is asymptotically valid. This FWE-controlling test bears clear
similarities to the Reality Check of White (2000), who proposes a method to test whether
one of a set of models significantly outperforms a benchmark.
3.4.2 FDR controlling method
Romano et al. (2008a) propose a method to control the FDR in a bootstrap setting. The
intuition is as follows. Consider the ordered series of test statistics, denoted T(k),t, such that
T(1),t ≤ ... ≤ T(s),t, with H(k),t the corresponding null hypothesis. Define T(k:l),t as the k-th
largest of the l test statistics T(1),t, ..., T(l),t. The idea is to reject all H(s),t, ..., H(s−h∗),t, where
h∗ is the largest integer h satisfying T(s),t ≥ cs,t, ..., T(s−h),t ≥ cs−h,t. Again, controlling the
FDR is a matter of choosing the appropriate critical values ck,t. Romano et al. (2008a)
show that, in order to control the FDR at level α, the critical values are defined recursively
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as follows: having determined cˆ1,t, ..., cˆh−1,t, compute cˆh,t according to:
cˆh,t = inf
{
x ∈ R :∑
s−h+1≤r≤s
r − s+ h
r
× P (T(h:h),t ≥ x, ..., T(s−r+1:h),t ≥ cˆs−r+1, T(s−r:h),t < cˆs−r) ≤ α}, (10)
with
cˆ1,t = inf
{
x ∈ R : 1
s
P
(
T(1),t ≥ x
) ≤ α} . (11)
Again, the probability distribution P will be approximated by a bootstrap counterpart.
Having obtained the critical values, starting with T(s),t and working downwards, we
check whether T(r),t ≥ cˆr,t and if the null is rejected, we eliminate the significantly less risky
firm from the set. The firms that remain after the h∗ rejected hypotheses are statistically
equally risky, and form a bucket. Romano et al. (2008a) prove that this bootstrap approach
asymptotically controls the FDR conditionally on the bootstrap being asymptotically valid.
4 Bootstrap Implementation
This section describes how to obtain c∗ij,T and P
∗ at particular date T . Consider N
assets or firms, and assume a general multivariate DGP for the corresponding returns,
rt = g(θ, t|Ft−1), with rt and t vectors of dimension N , and θ the set of model param-
eters. We assume t = (1,t, ..., N,t) to be i.i.d. over time-periods, with zero mean and
covariance matrix equal to the identity matrix. Notice that this representation allows
for non-linear cross-sectional dependence across the i,t elements. We define the inverse,
t = g
−1(θ, rt|Ft−1), which retrieves the innovations from the observed return process. For
instance, consider a single asset (N = 1), with demeaned returns rt = g(θ, t|Ft−1) = σtt,
where σt follows a GARCH process with parameters θ. Then, t = g
−1(θ, rt|Ft−1) = rt/σt
simply corresponds to the standardized return.
To obtain the bootstrap distribution, we employ a multivariate version of the method-
ology suggested by Pascual et al. (2006) and Christoffersen and Gonc¸alves (2005) for
GARCH forecasts. The approach is as follows. First estimate θ on the original series
rt for t = 1, ..., T − 1. Generate bootstrap series, r∗, using θˆ, and innovations drawn
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with replacement from the empirical distribution of the centered residuals. Estimate the
same model on the bootstrap series, to obtain θˆ∗. The bootstrap risk measure forecasts,
RM∗i,T = f
∗
i
(
θ̂∗, ω;Xi,T−1
)
is computed for each asset i = 1, ..., N , based on the original
past return series rT−1 and bootstrap parameter estimates θˆ
∗. The use of the original re-
turn series in RM∗i,T , instead of the bootstrapped ones, ensures that the current state of
the returns is taken into account in the bootstrap RM forecast. Then, the bootstrap only
measures the estimation uncertainty.
4.1 Bootstrap Algorithm
Hence, we propose the following algorithm:
1. Estimate the models to obtain θˆ. Use the parameter estimates to forecast xˆij,t, for
all pairs (i, j) ∈ {1, ..., N}2.
2. Compute the residuals ˆt = g
−1(θˆ, rt|Ft−1) for all t = 1, ..., T − 1.
3. Draw s1, ..., sT−1 i.i.d. from the uniform U{1,T−1} distribution and construct the boot-
strap errors from the centered residuals ∗bt = ˆst , ∀ t = 1, ..., T − 1.
4. Construct the bootstrap return series r∗bt = g(θˆ, 
∗b
t |Ft−1).
5. Estimate the model on the bootstrapped series to obtain θˆ∗b. Compute R̂M
∗b
i,T using
fi(θˆ
∗b
i , ω;Xi,T−1) and similarly for R̂M
∗b
j,T to obtain xˆ
∗b
ij,T .
6. Repeat steps 3 to 5 B times, obtaining bootstrap statistics x∗bij,T , b = 1, ..., B.
Two remarks have to be made concerning this bootstrap algorithm. First, note that in
Step 3, we re-sample cross-sectional vectors of residuals. The time-concordant sampling en-
sures that the potential cross-sectional dependence in the innovations is preserved. Second,
the critical values c∗ij,T and d
∗
ij,T are obtained as the α-quantiles of the ‘null-value shifted”
series |xˆ∗bij,T − xˆij,T | and Tmax∗bij,T − Tmaxij,T , respectively. Romano et al. (2008b, p. 412) argue
that using these “null-value shifted” series is equivalent to inverting bootstrap multiple
confidence regions, and therefore a valid approach. For a detailed description on how to
obtain the bootstrap critical values in the FDR procedure from the bootstrap distribution,
we refer to Romano et al. (2008a).
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4.2 Bootstrap Validity
A formal proof of the asymptotic validity of the bootstrap – in the sense that the bootstrap
correctly reproduces the asymptotic distribution of the risk measure estimator – is outside
the scope of this paper, as the general setup for the risk measures cannot be treated
uniformly with regards to the bootstrap. Instead, bootstrap validity has to be considered
for each case separately, and doing so explicitly would complicate the paper needlessly.
Instead, we provide some general guidelines for checking bootstrap validity. First, the
most important condition for the validity of the bootstrap, is that it correctly replicates
the asymptotic distribution of the estimators of the parameters θ. If the parametric model
assumed to estimate θ is correct, and the estimators of θ are “well-behaved”, for instance
by being
√
T -consistent and asymptotically normal, then it can typically be shown that
the bootstrap is asymptotically valid for these parameters. For instance, Shimizu (2010)
explicitly derives the bootstrap validity for the parameters of stationary ARMA-GARCH
models.
Our setting contains two additional difficulties. First, the distribution of the model
parameter estimators is only an intermediate step in obtaining the distribution of R̂M i,t. As
argued by Francq and Zako¨ıan (2015), given the distribution of these parameter estimators,
an application of the Delta method permits to derive the asymptotic distribution of the
risk measure estimator. The same Delta method argument can be applied to the bootstrap
and suggests that validity of the bootstrap parameter estimators suffices for establishing
bootstrap validity of the risk measure. However, a formal proof requires one to deal with
the subtleties involved with conditioning on the past for constructing the conditional risk
measure. Second, we need the joint distribution of R̂M i,t and R̂M j,t, which may be more
difficult to obtain even if the univariate distributions are known. For these two reasons we
believe that formal proofs of bootstrap validity for a general class of risk measures deserve
separate attention and are outside the scope of the paper. In what follows, we therefore
work under the assumption that the bootstrap method chosen for a particular risk measure
is appropriate. For our specific choices of bootstrap methods and risk measures, we return
to this issue in the simulation study where we study their small sample performance. The
results we find there do not give us a reason to doubt the validity of our bootstrap approach.
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5 Simulation Study
We use Monte Carlo simulations to study the properties of both the single test and the
bucketing procedure. The Monte Carlo simulation is performed on 1,000 replications.
For the bootstraps we generate B = 999 samples. We always compare the conditional
risk measures at time T and estimate them over the sample 1 to T − 1. We apply the
comparison test to the VaR, and both the single test and the bucketing procedure to the
MES, as defined in Examples 1 and 2 respectively. All the results are generated using Ox
version 7.00 (see Doornik, 2012) and the G@RCH package version 7.04 (Laurent, 2013).
5.1 Simulation Design
For the VaR, we consider two assets, indexed by i = 1, 2 , and the following DGP:
ri,t = σi,ti,t (12)
i,t
i.i.d.∼ ST (0, 1, νi) , (13)
where σ2i,t follows a GARCH(1,1) model with parameters (γ, α1, β1) = (0.05, 0.10, 0.85) for
both return series. The innovations follow a Student distribution with zero mean, unit
variance and degrees of freedom νi. Under the null, the τ -VaRs are equal for both series,
V aR1,T (τ) = V aR2,T (τ) ⇐⇒ t−1ν1 (τ)
√
(ν1 − 2)/ν1σ1,T = t−1ν2 (τ)
√
(ν2 − 2)/ν2σ2,T . To
impose this equality, we simulate processes and re-scale the returns ex-post such that the
volatilities at time T , σ1,T and σ2,T , imply the equality of both VaRs. We consider two
cases in which the degrees of freedom ν1 and ν2 are equal or different. In the former, the
volatility at time T is equal for both firms, in the latter case the volatility will be higher for
the firm with a higher degree of freedom. For the case with equal degrees of freedom, we
set ν1 = ν2 = 5. We set σ1,T = 2 and define σ2,T relative to that as ∆σ = σ2,T − σ1,T . We
use ∆σ = {0.0, 0.1, 0.2} to simulate under the null hypothesis (∆σ = 0) and alternatives
(∆σ > 0). In the case of different degrees of freedom, we set ν1 = 5 and ν2 = 7. Again
σ1,T = 2. We scale σ2,T such that the VaRs at time T have the same value under the null,
i.e. σ2,T =
t−15 (τ)
t−17 (τ)
√
21/25(σ1,T + ∆σ). In all cases, the coverage rate for the VaR is fixed at
5%, i.e. τ = 0.05.
For the MES, we consider the general DGP proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2015),
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i.e.
rm,t = σm,tm,t
ri,t = σi,t
(
ρi,tm,t +
√
1− ρ2i,tξi,t
)
(m,t, ξi,t) ∼ F,
(14)
where σm,t and σi,t follow GARCH processes, while ρi,t follows a DCC as described in
Example (3). F is a general zero mean, unit variance distribution, with unspecified non-
linear dependence structures. For the Monte Carlo simulations, we restrict the model to
a multivariate Gaussian conditional distribution and constant correlations, i.e. ρi,t = ρt
(CCC model). Of course, both assumptions will be relaxed in the empirical application.
Notice that, we have done simulations using DCC correlations for a few parameter settings
with a small number of replications and found very similar results to those reported here.
Since the innovations are i.i.d. and all dependence between firms and the market is
captured by the correlation, then the MES can be written as:
MESi,t(τ) = βi,tESm,t(τ), (15)
where βi,t = ρiσi,t/σm,t denotes the conditional beta of the firm i and ESm,t(τ) is the ES of
the market returns. Under the normality assumption, the ES has a closed form expression.
Denote by φ(.) and Φ(.) the standard normal univariate pdf and cdf, respectively. The
MES can be written as follows:
MESi,t(τ) = βi,tσm,tλ(Φ
−1(τ)) = ρi,tσi,tλ(Φ−1(τ)), (16)
where λ(z) = φ(z)/Φ(z) is the Mills ratio. Therefore, the MES solely depends on the
volatility of the firm and its correlation with the market. Under these assumptions, two
firms have equal MES if the product of conditional volatilities and conditional correlations
with the market at time T is equal. We use this result to control the relative risk of
simulated firms.
The GARCH parameters (γ, α1, β1)
′ are set to (0.05, 0.10, 0, 85)′ for each series. In order
to simulate the returns under the null and the alternative, we re-scale the simulated process
such as to control for the value of the MES at time T . For the single test, we generate
the returns for two firms and the market. The market has σm,T = 1. The first firm has
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Table 1: Rejection frequencies of the single test of equal VaR
VaR
T=1,000 T=2,000
ν2\∆σ 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2
5 0.045 0.523 0.652 0.049 0.613 0.846
7 0.052 0.544 0.721 0.050 0.671 0.844
MES
T=1,000 T=2,000
∆ρ\∆σ 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2
0.0000 0.046 0.414 0.763 0.048 0.592 0.850
0.0125 0.069 0.612 0.854 0.112 0.789 0.891
0.0250 0.199 0.791 0.888 0.310 0.877 0.920
Note: The table contains the rejection rates of a single test of equal VaR
and MES. Nominal size is 5%.
σ1,T = 2 and ρ1 = 0.4. We vary the volatility and correlation of the second firm. We
choose ∆σ = {0, 0.1, 0.2} and ∆ρ = {0, 0.0125, 0.0250}, where ∆ρ = ρ2 − ρ1. The distance
between the MES of firms 1 and 2 is therefore a function of the parameters (∆σ,∆ρ). For
instance, setting (∆σ,∆ρ) = (0.1, 0.0125) results in MES1,T = 1.650 and MES2,T = 1.787.
The null hypothesis of equal MES is obtained for (∆σ,∆ρ) = (0, 0).
For the bucketing procedure, we generate the returns for N firms and the market. In
order to obtain firms that satisfy the null hypothesis of equal systemic risk, we give all
firms within the same bucket identical variance and correlation. To illustrate the trade-off
between the FWE and FDR tests, we simulate N = 10, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100 firms. In each
simulation there are c = N/5 buckets, each containing five firms. The market again has
σm,T = 1. All firms i in bucket 1 have σ
(1)
i,T = 2, ρ
(1)
i = 0.4. All firms i in bucket k = 2, ..., c
have σ
(k)
i,T = 2+(k−1)∆σ and ρ(k)i = 0.4+(k−1)∆ρ. The difference between two successive
buckets in terms of volatility and correlation is therefore equal to that between the two
firms in the single test of equal MES. We also take the same values for {∆σ,∆ρ}.
5.2 Pairwise Comparison Test
Table 1 reports the rejection frequencies of the null hypothesis of equal VaR and equal MES
for T = 1, 000 and 2, 000 observations at the 5% significance level. The empirical size of
the test corresponds to the case ∆σ = ∆ρ = 0. Results suggest that for both risk measures
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and for all the DGPs we consider, the test does not suffer from any size distortion. Indeed
the rejection rates are remarkably close to the nominal size even for T = 1, 000.
The other entries in Table 1 correspond to power. We first consider the VaR. When the
second VaR is 5% bigger than the first one (∆σ = 0.1), power already exceeds 50%, and
it is close to 70% when the difference is twice as big. Power is increasing with the sample
size, and interestingly, power is bigger when the two series have different distributions.
Power for the MES test is comparable to the power of the single test for the VaR. Keep-
ing ∆ρ = 0 the values are very close to those of the VaR. Small changes in the correlation
are more difficult to precisely estimate than changes in volatility, and as such, power is
much lower in the direction of increasing correlation compared to increasing volatility. But
the differences do stack up: when both ∆ρ and ∆σ are large, power exceeds 90%.
5.3 Bucketing Procedure
In order to save space, we only report the results for T = 2, 000 and choose a significance
level for both the FDR and FWE of α = 0.05%. It is difficult to evaluate the bucketing
procedure in terms of size and power. This is mainly due to the fact that an error in any
of the iterations has an impact on the next steps. Indeed, the composition of the second
bucket will be affected by the composition of the first one, and so on. Moreover, we may
overestimate the number of buckets if, for instance, the first bucket is split up into two
separate buckets, such that the third estimated bucket is in fact the second bucket implied
by the DGP. As such, we do not expect to always have a one-to-one correspondence between
the generated ranking and the estimated ranking.
We therefore summarize the performance of our bucketing procedure in five numbers,
three based on the first bucket only, and two on the full ranking. The first two are the
actual FWE and FDR, computed on the first bucket. Next we consider the power of the
test, defined as the fraction of less risky firms that are successfully rejected. Finally, to
assess the accuracy of the complete ranking, we present the Spearman rank correlation
between the true and estimated rankings, as well as the total number of buckets found.
The latter should be close to N/5 when the bucketing procedure has an ideal trade-off
between Type I and Type II errors.
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Table 2 presents the results of the simulation. Each panel has one of the five performance
criteria, with the results for the FWE (resp. FDR) controlling procedure in the left-hand
(resp. right-hand) panel. First, both the FWE and FDR approaches control their respective
error. When the difference between buckets is small or the number of firms is large, the
FWE procedure tends to over-reject a bit, but the FWE is quite well controlled when the
difference between buckets is large. The FDR is too high when the number of firms is
small, and there is little difference between buckets. There is slight under-rejection when
the number of firms becomes very large, but the FDR is nicely around 0.05 when the
buckets are furthest apart. Of course, when the FDR is controlled, the actual FWE will
be above 0.05, as the number of correct rejections is far larger than the number of true
hypotheses. Similarly, the FDR of the FWE controlling procedure is generally below 0.05
for the same reason. Finally, as expected, the FDR procedure is uniformly more powerful
than the FWE procedure.
Next, consider the statistics on the complete ranking. First, the Spearman rank corre-
lation gives an indication on how good the ranking is. Importantly, even if the complete
ordering is correct, that is, firms are ranked above or at the same level as all firms that
are less risky, the Spearman correlation still penalizes if they are not in the correct bucket.
As such, when a bucket is split up into two estimated buckets, the rank correlation will go
down. The rank correlation of the FWE buckets is generally higher for N = 10, 20 and the
FDR has higher rank correlation with N = 40 and up. This is in line with general practise
where the FDR is often used as the number of hypothesis becomes large and power of FWE
controlling procedure drops. This is further evidenced by the final panel which shows the
number of buckets. The FDR procedure generally estimates a greater number of buckets,
as it rejects more null hypotheses by construction. The FWE generally has far too few
buckets. For instance, for N = 100, even in the case where the distance between buckets
is large, the average number of buckets is only 6.597. Interestingly, the FDR procedure
comes very close with an average of 19.103 buckets, when there are 20 true buckets.
We want to stress that we do not necessarily advocate the use of either method. The
FWE and FDR control are different statistics, and it is up to the user which one to control.
The FWE is always more conservative, but it loses power when the dimension of the problem
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becomes large. However, depending on the application, one might choose to control the
FWE even in large dimensions, if the cost of the false rejection is high.
6 Empirical Application
In this empirical application we apply the bucketing procedure to a panel of 94 large U.S.
financial firms. The dataset we use is identical to the panel studied by Acharya et al. (2010),
Brownlees and Engle (2015) and many other papers on similar topics. It contains daily
returns and market capitalizations retrieved from CRSP and quarterly book value of equity
from Compustat. The data covers the period between January 3, 2000 and December 31,
2012, for a total of 3,269 daily observations. The market return is approximated by the
CRSP market value-weighted index return. Market value is determined by CRSP daily
closing prices and number of shares outstanding. Quarterly book values of total liabilities
are from Compustat (LTQ). This results in a dataset containing all U.S. financial firms
with a market capitalization greater than 5 billions USD as of the end of June 2007. A full
list of ticker symbols and firms is given in Appendix A.
The objective of this empirical application is twofold. In a first section, we apply our
pairwise comparison test for the MES. We consider a subset of financial institutions in
order to emphasize the time profile of the systemic risk and the need for a comparison of
conditional risk measures. In a second section, we apply the bucketing procedure to the
full sample, contrasting the FWE with the FDR approach. Then, we estimate buckets for
the MES, %SRISK and ∆CoVaR.
The estimation of the three systemic risk measures is done according to the same
methodology as that recommended by their authors. The MES is estimated using C =
V aRm,t(0.05) and a DCC-GJR-GARCH model (estimated by QML). We check for possible
dynamics in the mean by minimizing the Schwarz Information Criteria for the individual
ARMA(m,n)-GJR-GARCH(1,1) models over m,n = 0, ..., 3. We test for the presence of
serial correlation in the standardized residuals and their squares, and fail to reject the null
for all series. As such the bootstrap for serially uncorrelated returns described in Section
4 will suffice. For the %SRISK, we fix the capital ratio k at 8%, following Brownlees and
Engle (2015). We only consider the series with strictly positive SRISK estimates. Finally,
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Table 2: Simulation Results Bucketing Procedure
FWE Controlling Procedure FDR Controlling Procedure
N 10 20 40 60 80 100 10 20 40 60 80 100
∆ρ ∆σ FWE
0.0125 0.0 0.098 0.144 0.250 0.291 0.332 0.375 0.186 0.225 0.324 0.358 0.404 0.436
0.0250 0.0 0.074 0.096 0.111 0.182 0.274 0.291 0.228 0.304 0.348 0.444 0.496 0.481
0.0000 0.1 0.055 0.062 0.064 0.083 0.100 0.084 0.133 0.185 0.334 0.437 0.532 0.553
0.0125 0.1 0.053 0.059 0.064 0.079 0.093 0.082 0.154 0.186 0.414 0.501 0.621 0.636
0.0250 0.1 0.052 0.054 0.062 0.071 0.083 0.078 0.185 0.208 0.406 0.583 0.587 0.653
0.0000 0.2 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.068 0.088 0.080 0.134 0.272 0.437 0.530 0.601 0.647
0.0125 0.2 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.065 0.078 0.077 0.164 0.336 0.503 0.565 0.657 0.679
0.0250 0.2 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.062 0.071 0.074 0.194 0.417 0.547 0.649 0.747 0.752
FDR
0.0125 0.0 0.254 0.187 0.139 0.087 0.063 0.048 0.259 0.186 0.137 0.086 0.064 0.050
0.0250 0.0 0.122 0.084 0.054 0.044 0.041 0.031 0.112 0.100 0.081 0.074 0.061 0.048
0.0000 0.1 0.123 0.053 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.160 0.076 0.067 0.040 0.036 0.029
0.0125 0.1 0.098 0.042 0.012 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.107 0.064 0.050 0.041 0.035 0.031
0.0250 0.1 0.063 0.041 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.088 0.059 0.051 0.045 0.036 0.044
0.0000 0.2 0.055 0.038 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.094 0.072 0.061 0.048 0.039 0.034
0.0125 0.2 0.053 0.044 0.010 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.081 0.061 0.055 0.050 0.041 0.042
0.0250 0.2 0.032 0.032 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.058 0.052 0.051 0.047 0.048 0.051
Power
0.0125 0.0 0.090 0.156 0.227 0.283 0.340 0.369 0.178 0.239 0.301 0.353 0.410 0.437
0.0250 0.0 0.106 0.166 0.499 0.513 0.675 0.591 0.212 0.248 0.370 0.482 0.789 0.737
0.0000 0.1 0.141 0.323 0.565 0.689 0.758 0.781 0.265 0.503 0.829 0.915 0.946 0.955
0.0125 0.1 0.166 0.375 0.571 0.761 0.786 0.818 0.348 0.610 0.886 0.944 0.982 0.986
0.0250 0.1 0.254 0.448 0.649 0.806 0.811 0.831 0.446 0.705 0.929 0.981 0.983 0.992
0.0000 0.2 0.236 0.541 0.720 0.788 0.825 0.842 0.407 0.826 0.940 0.961 0.974 0.978
0.0125 0.2 0.283 0.613 0.795 0.803 0.840 0.881 0.469 0.874 0.966 0.986 0.977 0.995
0.0250 0.2 0.377 0.645 0.828 0.867 0.883 0.926 0.480 0.904 0.972 0.991 0.993 1.000
Spearman Rank Correlation
0.0125 0.0 0.643 0.431 0.371 0.318 0.278 0.267 0.613 0.409 0.352 0.312 0.289 0.279
0.0250 0.0 0.706 0.464 0.395 0.366 0.333 0.350 0.660 0.430 0.434 0.389 0.368 0.354
0.0000 0.1 0.726 0.579 0.613 0.733 0.799 0.827 0.705 0.570 0.702 0.777 0.839 0.878
0.0125 0.1 0.798 0.644 0.676 0.800 0.847 0.836 0.797 0.587 0.789 0.791 0.899 0.934
0.0250 0.1 0.816 0.690 0.687 0.832 0.870 0.846 0.808 0.615 0.794 0.839 0.932 0.938
0.0000 0.2 0.772 0.697 0.783 0.848 0.874 0.899 0.742 0.691 0.834 0.903 0.933 0.948
0.0125 0.2 0.863 0.699 0.842 0.871 0.925 0.928 0.747 0.697 0.925 0.937 0.969 0.959
0.0250 0.2 0.910 0.722 0.869 0.918 0.937 0.978 0.769 0.702 0.956 0.985 0.999 0.989
Number of Buckets
0.0125 0.0 1.480 1.802 2.022 2.110 2.200 2.266 1.534 1.844 2.110 2.212 2.326 2.388
0.0250 0.0 1.502 1.914 2.248 2.435 3.063 4.140 1.560 2.214 2.564 3.524 4.623 3.899
0.0000 0.1 1.508 2.004 2.582 3.166 3.816 4.200 1.586 2.128 3.190 4.374 5.612 6.740
0.0125 0.1 1.547 2.071 2.704 4.093 4.121 6.146 1.662 2.543 4.446 4.468 9.080 10.411
0.0250 0.1 1.615 2.120 3.036 4.974 5.519 6.450 1.719 2.647 4.702 6.771 9.840 15.215
0.0000 0.2 1.622 2.202 3.240 4.166 4.996 5.678 1.748 2.790 4.916 7.094 9.304 11.362
0.0125 0.2 1.672 2.354 3.576 4.423 5.559 6.224 1.821 2.924 4.917 7.290 12.190 16.129
0.0250 0.2 1.739 2.436 3.975 5.044 5.704 6.597 1.882 3.058 5.560 9.117 12.520 19.103
Note: The table contains simulation results for various parameter settings {∆σ,∆ρ} and number of firms N . Each column
gives the results for N firms, which are allocated to N/5 buckets of five firms each. The left- and right-hand side give the
results for the FWE and FDR controlling procedures respectively. The first two panels give the FWE and FDR computed
on the first bucket only. The power is the fraction of firms successfully rejected for the first bucket. The fourth panel
gives the Spearman Rank correlation between the true and the estimated ranking, and finally we provide the number of
estimated buckets.
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for the ∆CoVaR we consider a risk level τ equal to 5%.
6.1 Time Series Properties of Risk Measures
In this section we restrict our analysis to the subset of the sixteen most risky firms which
were designated as Global and Domestic Systemically Important Banks (G- and D-SIBs)
in 2009 by the Stress Tests of the Federal Reserve and kept that status through 2014. On
every Friday of our sample, we estimate the conditional MES for each firm and we obtain
the estimates’ distribution by means of our bootstrapping procedure. Then, for all pairs of
firms, we test for equality of MES at these dates.
As all these financial institutions are systemically important, they are all risky. Their
time-series average MES ranges between about 2.43 for US Bancorp to 4.60 for Morgan
Stanley. The average standard deviation of MES over the sixteen firms equals 3.80, sug-
gesting that there is considerable time-variation in the MES.
To put our conditional approach into perspective, we contrast it with the unconditional
approach of a DM-type test (Diebold and Mariano, 1995). Using a DM test on the time-
series of MES forecasts, we reject the null of equal average risk for about 44% of the pairs.
However, this assumes that we are only interested in the average risk over a time-period of
twelve years. If we perform the DM test on single years, we reject on average 6.8% of the
null hypotheses. The reduction in sample size leads to far fewer rejections. Overall, these
results illustrate the limits of the risk comparison based on an unconditional approach. It
has good power to distinguish firms when the sample size is long enough, but the relative
risk of firms is too dynamic for the average risk over long periods to be of interest.
To illustrate our conditional approach, we plot the MES of J.P. Morgan and Goldman
Sachs, along with their difference and its 5% confidence bounds in Figure 1. Significant
differences are marked by shaded regions, dark indicating GS is more risky than JPM and
light shading indicating the reverse. This figure illustrates that the MES of the two firms
are highly correlated. Until 2008 the point estimates for GS are generally higher than those
for JPM, and this order is reversed after 2008. However, although the point estimates may
be different, they are not frequently significantly different. GS is more risky on 8.5% of
sample days, while JPM’s risk exceeds GS’ on just 5.9% of days, so that the parameters
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Figure 1: MES of JPM and GS
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Note: The top panel shows the estimated MES of JPM and GS in the period 2006-2011. The MES is estimated every Friday.
The bottom panel shows the difference, along with bootstrap confidence bounds. The shaded regions represent a significant
difference between the two. When the shading is dark, GS has significantly higher MES than JPM, when it is light the reverse
is true.
can only be estimated precisely enough on about 14.4% of the days to truly distinguish the
two banks. Importantly, significant rejections are clustered with an autocorrelation of 0.7,
meaning that the single days where one firm is more risky than the other, are rare.
The results for all other pairs are summarized in Figure 2. This figure plots the rejection
frequencies for each pair, where the color corresponds to a value determining the frequency
at which the firm on the y-axis is found to be more risky than the one on the x-axis. The
heatmap shows that even the firms with highest MES are only significantly more risky
(at 5%) than firms with the lowest MES about 20-25% of the time. On average, across
pairs, we find a significant difference between firms on 16.4% percent of the days. Different
significance levels do not change the relative picture much, but at 10% the highest rejection
frequencies approach 50%.
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Figure 2: Significant difference MES
Note: The heatmap plots the rejection frequencies over the full sample of the hypothesis that H0 : xij,t = 0 vs H1 : xij,t > 0,
with i on the y-axis and j on the x-axis. A value of 0.25 means that the firm on y-axis had significantly higher MES than
the firm on the x-axis on 25% of the days.
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Table 3: Bucket Allocation – Top 10
MES %SRISK ∆CoVaR
Tick FWE FDR Est. Tick FWE FDR Est. Tick FWE FDR Est.
30-06-2008
LEH 1 1 10.287 C 1 1 0.152 FITB 1 1 3.480
MBI 1 1 9.781 BAC 2 2 0.091 HBAN 1 1 2.874
CIT 1 1 8.111 JPM 2 3 0.081 LEH 1 1 2.685
WM 1 1 7.459 MER 2 3 0.078 KEY 1 1 2.372
PFG 1 1 6.563 MS 3 4 0.073 RF 1 1 2.330
ABK 1 2 7.806 FRE 4 5 0.065 C 1 1 2.277
FITB 1 2 7.733 FNM 4 6 0.063 STI 1 1 2.034
C 1 2 5.816 AIG 4 7 0.057 BBT 1 1 2.017
FRE 1 2 5.713 GS 5 7 0.056 AIG 1 1 2.008
MER 2 2 6.248 LEH 6 8 0.052 MI 1 1 1.951
30-01-2009
STT 1 1 22.188 JPM 1 1 0.153 AFL 1 1 9.049
C 1 1 20.884 C 2 2 0.142 PNC 1 1 8.266
HBAN 1 1 20.775 BAC 3 3 0.129 STT 1 1 6.891
FITB 1 1 19.821 WFC 4 4 0.093 FITB 1 1 6.414
PNC 1 1 19.817 AIG 5 5 0.063 BAC 1 1 5.974
AFL 1 1 19.499 GS 5 6 0.061 ACAS 1 1 5.537
LNC 1 1 19.032 MS 6 7 0.046 ALL 1 1 5.487
BAC 1 1 18.491 MET 6 8 0.036 WFC 1 1 5.399
HIG 1 1 17.415 PRU 7 9 0.034 STI 1 1 5.258
PFG 1 1 17.097 HIG 8 10 0.022 C 1 1 5.139
Note: This table provides the ranking estimated by the FWE and FDR controlling methods, based on
the MES, %SRISK and ∆CoVaR risk measures. We show only the top 10 of firms sorted by assigned
bucket.
6.2 Buckets
In this section, we apply the bucketing procedure to the 94 financial institutions for three
systemic risk measures, the MES, the %SRISK and the ∆CoVaR, which were defined in
Examples 2, 3 and 4. By applying the bucketing procedure, we test whether an absolute
ranking can be distinguished. If no absolute ranking can be distinguished, we want to test
whether we can, at least, identify buckets of firms that are indistinguishable from each
other within the bucket but distinguishable from firms belonging to lower ranked buckets.
The three systemic risk measures are differently affected by the estimation risk, and are
also likely to differ in the ordering of their point estimates (Benoit et al., 2012). As a
consequence, different risk measures can lead to different rankings.
We estimate the bucket allocation for the MES, %SRISK and ∆CoVaR on eight pre-
determined dates coinciding with those considered in Brownlees and Engle (2015). A firm
is included in the ranking at a certain date, if the firm still exists and furthermore, there are
at least 1,000 observations up until this date. Table 3 displays the results of the bucketing
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procedure, with α = 0.05, for two days. The results for the remaining days are deferred
to Appendix B. The firms are first ranked in terms of their bucket, and within buckets we
order the firms in descending value of their risk measure estimate, even though there is no
statistical evidence that their risk is statistically different. We then report the ten highest
ranked firms, as is done in Brownlees and Engle (2015). For each firm, we report the point
estimate, as well as the allocated bucket according to the FWE and the FDR method.
The results suggest that it is indeed difficult to find significant differences between the
estimated risk measures. Although point estimates may vary considerably, they are not
necessarily statistically different. In general, in line with theory, the FDR method is more
powerful, and we obtain smaller buckets compared to the FWE. In June 2008, the precision
of the MES estimates allows for a division of the top 10 risky firms into two buckets. The
size of the most risky bucket using FDR is five firms, compared to nine for the FWE. The
procedure rejects more frequently for the %SRISK, allowing for six or eight buckets for the
top 10 firms. The reason for this is that the liabilities and the market value of the firm,
introduced in the definition of the SRISK (see Example 3), add variability between the
different point estimates, without adding additional estimation risk. In fact, in January
2009 we find an absolute ranking using the FDR method. Like for the MES, it is difficult
to statistically distinguish firms based on ∆CoVaR. The ∆CoVaR is defined as the product
of a conditional VaR and a quantile regression parameter (see Example 4). Most of the
estimation risk comes from the quantile regression. For instance, the highest point forecast
of ∆CoVaR is 9.05 for AFL, but its bootstrap standard deviation is close to 4. In an
unreported simulation, we find that even if the true DGP is exactly the one assumed here,
the standard deviation of the ∆CoVaR is still on average over 40% of its value. These
results are in line with those obtained in another context by Guntay and Kupiec (2015).
Replacing the quantile estimate γα of Example 4 with an OLS estimate significantly reduces
the uncertainty, leading to buckets of sizes in between those of MES and %SRISK.
In Table 4, we investigate the sensitivity of the bucketing procedure to the significance
level chosen. We report the total number of estimated buckets on each of the eight days,
at five different significance levels. The Model Confidence Set (Hansen et al., 2011), on
which our procedure is based, is commonly estimated using confidence levels upwards of
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Table 4: Number of estimated buckets
Date #Firms Significance Level
FWE Controlling Procedure FDR Controlling Procedure
20% 10% 5% 2.5% 1% 20% 10% 5% 2.5% 1%
MES
30-03-2007 83 5 4 4 3 3 7 6 4 4 3
29-06-2007 83 5 3 3 3 3 5 4 4 3 3
31-12-2007 81 5 4 4 4 3 10 8 5 5 5
29-02-2008 82 5 5 4 4 4 12 8 5 5 4
30-06-2008 82 5 5 5 5 5 11 7 6 6 5
29-08-2008 81 8 7 6 5 5 16 10 8 7 7
30-01-2009 73 6 5 4 4 4 15 9 7 6 5
30-06-2010 75 4 3 3 3 3 7 5 5 4 4
%SRISK
30-03-2007 14 6 6 5 5 4 7 6 6 6 5
29-06-2007 13 6 5 4 4 4 10 7 6 6 4
31-12-2007 36 17 13 11 11 11 21 17 15 15 12
29-02-2008 37 16 15 13 12 12 25 19 17 16 14
30-06-2008 39 18 17 15 13 12 37 26 21 19 17
29-08-2008 36 15 14 13 11 10 33 25 18 16 15
30-01-2009 53 31 29 29 29 29 49 45 39 34 31
30-06-2010 37 18 16 15 13 11 31 22 20 18 15
∆CoVaR
30-03-2007 83 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1
29-06-2007 83 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
31-12-2007 81 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
29-02-2008 82 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
30-06-2008 82 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2
29-08-2008 81 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
30-01-2009 73 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 3 3 3
30-06-2010 75 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
Note: This table reports the sensitivity of the procedures to the level of FWE and FDR that is controlled. We show the
total number of firm and the number of buckets they are assigned to.
20%. We generally have enough power to be more prudent and consider 20, 10, 5, 2.5 and
1%, for both FWE and FDR. As a reference, the second column of the table gives the total
number of firms under consideration, providing a cap on the number of buckets possible.
As rejection occurs more frequently with lower significance levels, the number of buckets
is increasing with the significance level. We confirm that the FDR procedure is uniformly
more powerful than the FWE procedure. For instance for the MES, the FDR estimates
up to twice as many buckets than the FWE. With the %SRISK, the FDR procedure
using high confidence levels comes close to absolute rankings, with the total number of
buckets only slightly lower than the number of firms. Even at very stringent levels, we get
interesting rankings with buckets that do not contain more than three or four firms. Finally,
significance levels of 20% still do not help with disentangling the ∆CoVaR of different firms.
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This reaffirms the uncertainty in the quantile regression estimates.
7 Conclusion
This paper introduces a bootstrap-based comparison test of two risk measures, as well
as an iterative procedure to produce a grouped ranking of N > 2 assets or firms, given
their conditional risk measures. These tests can be applied to a wide variety of conditional
risk measures, while taking into account their estimation risk. Simulation results on VaR
and MES forecasts suggest that the pairwise comparison test has good properties in finite
samples, both in terms of size and power. Since the bucketing procedure is clearly a multiple
testing problem, we propose two versions, one controlling the FWE rate, and one controlling
the FDR rate. Simulations show that both set-ups do control their respective rates, and
illustrate the trade-off of using either method depending on the size of the problem.
In the empirical application, we apply the pairwise comparison test to the MES esti-
mates of sixteen U.S. G- and D-SIBs. This application points out the advantages of the
comparison of conditional risk measures. We observe a great time-variation in conditional
MES estimates, and from one week to the next, firms’ relative ranking often changes. While
unconditional tests of equal MES between any of the pairs is rejected in 44% of the days,
the conditional test only rejects equal risk 6.8% of the time, showing that, on most days,
we cannot distinguish firms in terms of their riskiness.
We applied the bucketing procedure for three popular systemic risk measures, namely
the MES, the ∆CoVaR and the SRISK. We find that for both versions of the procedure,
the MES and ∆CoVaR are estimated with too much uncertainty to reject equality often.
For most of the eight dates considered in the application, the first thirty firms belong to the
same bucket of riskiest firms. Consequently, ranking firms on the basis of point forecasts of
MES and ∆CoVaR seems hazardous. However, when applied on %SRISK, our bucketing
procedure is able to identify a meaningful ranking of buckets containing equally risky firms
in each bucket. This results is mainly due to the differences observed in the liabilities and
the market value of the financial institutions over the period 2000-2012. Since the liabilities
and market values are not estimated, these differences add cross-sectional variability in the
systemic risk measures, without adding additional estimation risk. Our results clearly
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illustrate the importance of taking into account the estimation risk when establishing a
ranking of the financial institutions according to their systemic risk.
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A Company Tickers
Depositories(29) Insurance (32)
BAC Bank of America ABK Ambac Financial Group
BBT BB&T AET Aetna
BK Bank of New York Mellon AFL Aflac
C Citigroup AIG American International Group
CBH Commerce Bancorp AIZ Assurant
CMA Comerica inc ALL Allstate Corp
HBAN Huntington Bancshares AOC Aon Corp
HCBK Hudson City Bancorp WRB W.R. Berkley Corp
JPM JP Morgan Chase BRK Berkshire Hathaway
KEY Keycorp CB Chubb Corp
MI Marshall & Ilsley CFC Countrywide Financial
MTB M&T Bank Corp CI CIGNA Corp
NCC National City Corp CINF Cincinnati Financial Corp
NTRS Northern Trust CNA CNA Financial corp
NYB New York Community Bancorp CVH Coventry Health Care
PBCT Peoples United Financial FNF Fidelity National Financial
PNC PNC Financial Services GNW Genworth Financial
RF Regions Financial HIG Hartford Financial Group
SNV Synovus Financial HNT Health Net
SOV Sovereign Bancorp HUM Humana
STI Suntrust Banks LNC Lincoln National
STT State Street MBI MBIA
UB Unionbancal Corp MET Metlife
USB US Bancorp MMC Marsh & McLennan
WB Wachovia PFG Principal Financial Group
WFC Wells Fargo & Co PGR Progressive
WM Washington Mutual PRU Prudential Financial
WU Western Union SAF Safeco
ZION Zion TMK Torchmark
TRV Travelers
UNH Unitedhealth Group
UNM Unum Group
Broker-Dealers (10) Others (23)
AGE A.G. Edwards ACAS American Capital
BSC Bear Stearns AMP Ameriprise Financial
ETFC E-Trade Financial AMTD TD Ameritrade
GS Goldman Sachs AXP American Express
LEH Lehman Brothers BEN Franklin Resources
MER Merill Lynch BLK Blackrock
MS Morgan Stanle BOT CBOT Holdings
NMX Nymex Holdings CBG C.B. Richard Ellis Group
SCHW Schwab Charles CBSS Compass Bancshares
TROW T.Rowe Price CIT CIT Group
CME CME Group
COF Capital One Financial
EV Eaton Vance
FITB Fifth Third bancorp
FNM Fannie Mae
FRE Freddie Mac
HRB H&R Block
ICE Intercontinental Exchange
JNS Janus Capital
LM Legg Mason
NYX NYSE Euronext
SEIC SEI Investments Company
SLM SLM Corp
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B Bucket Allocation Top 10
MES %SRISK ∆CoVaR
Tick FWE FDR Est. Tick FWE FDR Est. Tick FWE FDR Est.
30-03-2007
LEH 1 1 3.540 MS 1 1 0.212 LEH 1 1 1.094
BSC 1 1 3.469 FRE 2 2 0.146 AGE 1 1 1.053
MS 1 1 3.446 FNM 2 2 0.134 MS 1 1 0.979
AMTD 1 1 3.427 MER 2 3 0.105 BSC 1 1 0.952
ETFC 1 1 3.260 LEH 3 3 0.104 BEN 1 1 0.904
AGE 1 1 3.221 GS 3 3 0.103 MER 1 1 0.900
JNS 1 1 3.159 BSC 4 4 0.091 GS 1 1 0.894
GS 1 1 3.158 MET 5 5 0.034 LM 1 1 0.844
BEN 1 1 3.155 HIG 5 5 0.019 C 1 1 0.831
MER 1 1 2.816 PRU 5 5 0.018 BBT 1 1 0.821
29-06-2007
AMTD 1 1 3.009 MS 1 1 0.179 MBI 1 1 0.944
BSC 1 1 2.799 FRE 1 2 0.164 GS 1 1 0.848
MER 1 1 2.630 MER 1 2 0.155 C 1 1 0.814
MBI 1 1 2.619 BSC 2 3 0.111 LEH 1 1 0.800
SCHW 1 1 2.601 LEH 2 3 0.109 MER 1 1 0.790
GS 1 1 2.544 FNM 2 3 0.094 JPM 1 1 0.762
LEH 1 1 2.431 GS 2 4 0.092 BSC 1 1 0.754
ETFC 1 1 2.350 MET 3 5 0.033 SCHW 1 1 0.728
TROW 1 1 2.235 PRU 3 5 0.026 EV 1 1 0.712
MS 1 1 2.197 HIG 3 5 0.021 HRB 1 1 0.685
31-12-2007
ETFC 1 1 9.406 C 1 1 0.166 MBI 1 1 3.173
MBI 1 1 9.288 MER 2 2 0.102 ABK 1 1 2.377
ABK 1 1 7.528 MS 3 3 0.092 ETFC 1 1 2.288
FRE 1 1 6.960 FRE 3 4 0.084 SLM 1 1 2.123
CFC 1 1 6.036 FNM 3 5 0.077 NCC 1 1 1.741
WM 1 1 5.815 GS 3 5 0.076 WM 1 1 1.731
CITa 1 1 5.378 LEH 4 6 0.061 C 1 1 1.688
FNM 1 1 5.276 JPM 4 6 0.060 FRE 1 1 1.621
HBAN 1 1 4.629 BAC 4 7 0.040 FITB 1 1 1.579
MS 1 2 5.148 BSC 5 7 0.034 BBT 1 1 1.548
29-02-2008
ABK 1 1 8.266 C 1 1 0.151 AIG 1 1 1.774
MBI 1 1 7.644 MER 2 2 0.089 CNA 1 1 1.715
LEH 1 1 5.279 MS 2 3 0.083 MI 1 1 1.674
CIT 1 1 5.279 FNM 2 4 0.078 MER 1 1 1.666
WM 1 1 5.150 JPM 2 4 0.077 C 1 1 1.575
MER 1 1 5.105 BAC 2 5 0.074 RF 1 1 1.571
FRE 1 1 4.816 FRE 3 5 0.074 LEH 1 1 1.561
CNA 1 1 4.783 GS 3 6 0.061 JPM 1 1 1.503
MI 1 1 4.613 LEH 4 7 0.045 EV 1 1 1.467
BSC 1 1 4.607 BSC 5 8 0.038 HBAN 1 1 1.402
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MES %SRISK ∆CoVaR
Tick FWE FDR Est. Tick FWE FDR Est. Tick FWE FDR Est.
29-08-2008
FRE 1 1 13.593 C 1 1 0.134 AIG 1 1 2.972
FNM 1 1 13.399 JPM 2 2 0.097 LEH 1 1 2.495
ABK 1 1 12.942 BAC 2 2 0.096 MI 1 1 2.491
LEH 1 1 12.422 MER 3 3 0.074 FRE 1 1 2.429
MBI 1 2 9.642 FRE 3 3 0.074 MER 1 1 2.306
AIG 1 2 8.656 AIG 3 4 0.072 RF 1 1 2.304
RF 1 2 7.682 FNM 4 4 0.070 KEY 1 1 2.049
MER 2 2 8.633 MS 5 5 0.067 FNM 1 1 2.006
BAC 2 2 7.227 GS 6 6 0.060 SNV 1 1 1.967
WM 2 2 6.969 LEH 7 7 0.051 C 1 1 1.939
30-06-2010
ABK 1 1 7.617 C 1 1 0.164 MTB 1 1 1.927
CBG 1 1 6.968 BAC 1 1 0.161 BEN 1 1 1.882
MI 1 1 6.792 JPM 2 2 0.138 TROW 1 1 1.788
JNS 1 1 6.752 AIG 3 3 0.086 EV 1 1 1.674
ETFC 1 1 6.680 MS 4 4 0.071 MI 1 1 1.655
ACAS 1 1 6.619 WFC 4 5 0.048 AFL 1 1 1.609
LNC 1 1 6.568 MET 5 5 0.046 AXP 1 1 1.575
PFG 1 1 6.319 GS 5 5 0.044 CINF 1 1 1.512
MBI 1 1 6.229 PRU 5 6 0.042 GS 1 1 1.492
AMP 1 1 6.188 HIG 6 7 0.031 SCHW 1 1 1.472
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